Belgium’s new coalition emerges after months of wrangling, pledging reforms while risking public backlash.
After seven months of partisan wrangling, Belgium’s political leaders have formed a coalition government, ensuring that one of Europe’s most fractious democracies can avoid an extended power vacuum. On Friday, King Philippe announced that Bart De Wever, leader of the conservative Flemish nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), had brokered a deal to create a five-party cabinet. Assuming the arrangement secures approval by the respective party congresses, Mr De Wever will be sworn in as Belgium’s next prime minister.
For observers of Belgian politics, protracted negotiations are nothing new. In 2010–2011, the country endured a record 541 days without a government. Yet this latest impasse—at just seven months—has been shaped by issues that resonate across Europe. The debate centred on how to control a rising budget deficit, which threatens to breach the European Union’s fiscal rules, without unravelling cherished social programmes. The result is a precarious deal that aims to preserve key elements of Belgium’s welfare state while implementing meaningful cost-cutting measures.
The driving force behind the new government is Mr De Wever’s New Flemish Alliance, which emerged as the largest single party in the June elections, winning about 17% of the vote. Its relatively narrow plurality still outpaced that of Vlaams Belang, an even more hard-line far-right separatist party, underscoring the popularity of nationalist sentiment in Flanders—Belgium’s Dutch-speaking north. Although the N-VA has long advocated greater Flemish autonomy, Mr De Wever’s brand of conservatism has gained traction in a climate of economic anxiety and growing frustration with traditional centrist parties.
No single party can govern Belgium alone. Negotiations required forming a coalition with four others: on the Flemish side, the Christian Democratic and Flemish party (CD&V) and the socialist Vooruit (“Forward”); on the Francophone side, the liberal Reformist Movement (MR) and the centrist Les Engagés. This alignment spans a broad ideological spectrum—from Flemish conservatives to Francophone social liberals—highlighting the compromises that typify Belgian politics.
Belgium’s underlying dilemma is financial. The country’s budget deficit reached an estimated 4.6% of GDP last year, placing Brussels in the crosshairs of the EU’s recently tightened fiscal rules. Should Belgium fail to produce an approved budget plan in time, it could be placed on a restrictive four-year adjustment path, risking significant fines.
Central to the government’s negotiations was how to contain swelling pension and healthcare costs that have risen alongside the country’s ageing population. France’s recent move to raise its retirement age, triggering large-scale protests, offers a cautionary tale. In Belgium, early plans to reduce pension benefits and modify the automatic indexation of wages—under which workers’ pay is adjusted in line with inflation—sparked demonstrations by teachers, military personnel and trade unionists. The new coalition is therefore trying to strike a careful balance: adopting sufficient fiscal discipline to satisfy Brussels without provoking a social backlash at home.
According to leaked drafts, the prospective deal features: modest pension cuts, pledges of increased military spending, and a small package of tax reductions to stimulate the economy. Yet there are signs that each coalition partner extracted certain political concessions. The final agreement guarantees indexation and ensures the payment of pensions for today and tomorrow, underscoring the importance placed on preserving core social protections.
In style and substance, Mr De Wever’s government is expected to depart from its predecessor’s approach in several respects. While all Belgian coalitions must contend with budgetary pressures, the N-VA’s conservative tilt suggests sharper spending cuts than under previous administrations. The lingering question is whether concessions offered to left-leaning and centrist partners will blunt or dilute those plans.
Mr De Wever has consistently advocated a tougher line on immigration, arguing that Belgium’s welfare state cannot afford unchecked growth in benefit claims. His coalition partners have not been uniformly enthusiastic about this stance, so the outcome will likely be a compromise: somewhat tighter migration regulations, though it will stop short of the sweeping restrictions a purely nationalist government might impose.
Flemish nationalism remains a core ideology for the N-VA. Although Wallonia’s left-leaning parties have typically resisted significant devolution, the new balance of power may reignite debates over confederal structures or additional transfers of authority to Flanders and Wallonia. Any shift in that direction risks widening the long-standing linguistic and ideological rifts that partition the country.
The talks confirm that wage indexation and pension entitlements will see some recalibration. Whether that proves sufficient to align Belgium’s finances with EU expectations without sparking labour unrest remains to be seen.
A leaner budget and a more flexible wage system may boost the competitiveness of Belgian companies, especially in global markets. Proponents of reform argue that modest cutbacks to social spending could accelerate growth and investment, thereby strengthening a relatively small economy that accounts for only around 3.4% of total EU GDP.
On the other hand, tampering with Belgium’s robust social model might provoke further street protests and union action. Belgians fiercely defend their pensions, healthcare provisions and welfare benefits. Sustained pushback—similar to what France experienced—could force the government into a less ambitious agenda.
With Brussels as home to both the EU and NATO, Belgium’s policy shifts draw immediate regional attention. EU officials will be watching closely to see if the new government can deliver on deficit-reduction commitments. Failure to enact promised reforms might imperil Belgium’s standing in the bloc and lead to formal sanctions.
Finally, the five-party alliance may have a parliamentary majority on paper, but internal divisions could easily surface if Mr De Wever’s proposals go too far. The coalition’s ideological diversity means each faction will be prone to second-guessing or renegotiating the government’s direction, especially when public sentiment changes.
Belgian coalition-building has long reflected the country’s linguistic and cultural divides. This time, however, the added strain of EU-imposed fiscal discipline made the process even more convoluted. The new administration inherits the difficult task of trimming a worrisome deficit just as social and demographic realities make it harder to rein in costs.
Yet for all its complexity, Belgium’s ability to strike a deal underscores a tenacious tradition of compromise. Despite regular predictions of a rupture between Flanders and Wallonia, governments have repeatedly found ways to work together—often at the eleventh hour. That a coalition finally emerged without slipping into a prolonged stalemate should reassure markets, at least in the near term.
What remains to be seen is whether Mr De Wever, a conservative nationalist, can maintain this delicate balancing act among his diverse partners and an often-divided public. Should he succeed, Belgium’s new government may chart a middle path between prudent budget discipline and preserving core social protections—an approach that could serve as a model for other European countries struggling with similar challenges. Should he fail, the political divisions on display this year may only deepen, ushering in yet another protracted struggle in the years to come.
